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Evaluating Safe Deficit Targets and Automatic Stabilisers under the SGP





Rule guided fiscal policy in the UK and the Euro Area puts weight on the automatic
stabilisers. We assess the scale of these stabilisers in the UK and the Euro Area
countries using a large, New Keynesian estimated macro model, NiGEM. The model
is in wide use in finance ministries and central banks through out the Euro Area, and
was extensively used in the assessment of UK membership of the Euro Area.
Assessing the stabilisers allows us to investigate fiscal policy multipliers and assess
model properties. Stabilisers are thought to be stronger than the evidence suggests,
and as a result there is a case for more active fiscal policy. We discuss the Treasury
proposal for automatic active fiscal responses to strengthen the stabilising properties
of government policy.2
Introduction
In this paper we discuss fiscal pacts and fiscal targets, and relate the literature to the
discussion of discretionary fiscal policy and the operation of automatic stabilisers.
Discussions of Monetary Union have made it clear that without independent monetary
policy, fiscal policy becomes more important as a stabilisation mechanism so it is
important to establish what degree of stabilisation we have. The European
Commission's work on minimum benchmarks for fiscal policy and budget targets
within the Stability and Growth Pact puts significant weight on automatic stabilisers.
There are several ways to construct minimum benchmarks for budget targets. The
cyclical sensitivity of the budget is a key question for both setting targets and
analysing automatic stabilisers. A rigid interpretation of the Pact would force
governments to make a trade-off between size of automatic stabilisers (and indeed
operation of fiscal policy generally for stabilisation purposes) and meeting the Pact’s
requirements. Hence an understanding of the scale of stabilisers and ways of
evaluating targets is important when discussing fiscal policy in Europe. The UK
Treasury in its discussion document on Fiscal stabilisation and EMU (H.M. Treasury
(2003) discuss the evidence on stabilisers, as conclude, as do we that they are likely to
be weak, and hence suggest that there is a role for automatic ‘discretionary’ responses.
We first discuss the reason for pacts. We then evaluate the role of automatic
stabilisers in response to demand shocks, as these will be required to do most of the
work allocated to fiscal policy within the current framework of pacts. We do this the
Commission methodology both for evaluating stabilisers and setting targets. Brunila,
Buti and in’t Veld (2002) use the Commission’s QUEST model to evaluate the scale
of the impact on deficits of deviations of output from equilibrium, and look at the
impact of such changes in deficits on the level of output by analysing a limited
number of shocks to the economy. Our work is a departure from Barrell and Pina,
(2003) and Barrell, Hurst and Pina (2003) which use all shocks to the economy and
the OECD methods of evaluating stabilisers. We conclude that automatic stabilisers
remove around 5 to 11% of the demand shocks that turned up in the in the 1990s. It is
not at all clear that they remove supply shocks, and indeed their existence can amplify
these shocks, as Blanchard (2000) argues.
We concentrate on the five largest economies in Europe for the sake of clarity. Barrell
and Hurst (2003) report related results for 12 European economies, and H.M.
Treasury (2003) p 54 reports our estimates of the overall stabilisers for the same 12
European countries.3
Fiscal policy
Fiscal policies involve the setting of taxes and expenditures and they are embedded in
a political environment that makes decision making over the government deficit
difficult. There is a clear connection between the economic cycle and the deficit, in
part because taxes and expenditures respond automatically to the cycle, but also
because politicians find it difficult not to respond to the state of the economic cycle.
To the extent that taxes fall with incomes and spending, and expenditure rises with
unemployment, the government budget can be seen as a shock absorber, using
automatic stabilisers.
There are always pressures to increase borrowing over the cycle, but this inevitably
puts pressure on real interest rates. The real rate of interest in the economy is a price
that reflects the balance of saving and investment, and an increase in government
borrowing might be expected to put upward pressure on the rate. This in turn might
lead to the crowding out of private sector investment and hence the reduction, at least
in the long run, of production potential. Higher levels of debt also raise pressure on
governments to use inflation as a way of reducing the burden of debt, and this risk
may also affect long term prospects for output.
The risks of higher inflation and higher real rates have been important when
politicians have considered the design of the Stability Pact in Europe. A government
acting alone might still decide to have a Pact with its own citizens, as in the UK. The
long term real interest rate that affects private sector investment depends on expected
short term real interest rates over the future, and these in turn depend upon
expectations of the fiscal stance and government borrowing. A credible pact between
the government and its citizens assures them that the risks of it borrowing excessively
in future are low, and hence anticipated real interest rates will be lower than they
otherwise would have been.
There is a great deal of uncertainty in the economy, and it is very difficult to extract
signals about changes in trend output and cyclically adjusted budget deficits from the
barrage of data facing economists and politicians. In downturns governments borrow
and use fiscal policy to offset slow growth. In upturns the strength of tax revenues is
taken to be a sign of a ‘new economy’ and tax rates are cut rather than debt reduced.
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As a result government debt ratcheted up and the real interest rate facing the private
sector rose over the 1970s and 1980s, inducing a noticeable tightening of policy in the
1990s as fiscal pacts began to bite. One way round the problem of government
optimism in the upturn is to have clear and independently produced indicators of the
fiscal stance and the cyclical position that it does not produce.
                                                          
1 Melitz (2002) documents the potential asymmetry in government responses4
Random fluctuations in the deficit are probably more common than is often
recognised. Receipts or spending may not be ‘on plan’ and hence the deficit may be at
undesired levels. Good housekeeping requires that at some point corrective action is
taken if either receipts are too high (or too low) or spending too low (or high). If
politicians set themselves targets for debts or deficits they should also be clear that
they stand ready to adjust tax rates down (or up) if the deficit turns out better (or
worse) than planned without a cyclical or discretionary policy explanation.
Cyclical, Discretionary and Random Components in the Budget
Seemingly random fluctuations in the government budgetary position are common.
Tax revenues change for many reasons, and probably the least significant are those
associated with the economic cycle. Tax revenues tend to fall with the cycle, whilst
expenditure rises with it, and hence when evaluating the budgetary stance it is
important to understand the cyclical position. However, it is extremely difficult to
assess what the cyclical position of the economy might be, and there are a large
number of ways of extracting the information, as Massman, Mitchell and Weale
(2003) discuss. Even if we can measure the cycle, it is important to know what has
driven a particular cycle before one can asses its implications for the budget position.
There has been considerable debate about the scale of changes in revenues and
spending in relation to the cycle, and it is widely thought that a 1% deviation in GDP
from its trend might cause a 0.5 percent of GDP change in the budget deficit. This
figure is perhaps a little high and it should differ noticeably between countries and
will also depend on the causes of the cyclical movement. A slowdown in activity
driven by falling export demand is likely to have noticeably less impact on revenues
than one driven by weak consumer spending, as the latter is more tax rich than the
former. It is clear from this that producing a single gross measure of the sensitivity of
the budget to the cycle is a best misleading. Although a single measure is simple and
transparent, the trade off with information about the causes of the shift in the budget
may be too great.
Discerning discretionary fiscal policy moves is difficult, as it involves the detailed
analysis of budgets and their impacts. Changes in tax rates and the definition of tax
bases must be seen as discretionary movements in the government position, as must
changes in expenditure on goods services and transfers. In general an improvement in
the budgetary position made by a conscious discretionary policy might be expected to
have a contractionary impact on the economy in the short term, although it might lead
to lower long term real interest rates, and these might offset the contractionary impact
of the policy. However, it is important not to assume that any non-cyclical movement
in the budget represents discretionary policy.5
Random variations in tax receipts or in spending may push the budget outturn well
away from its predicted level without there being a cyclical explanation or a
discretionary policy driving the change. Economic models cannot encompass all of
the factors driving the economy, and models explaining tax receipts are bound to be
incomplete descriptions. Tax receipts may change even when both the tax base and
the tax rate do not move. A change in tax paying behaviour after the introduction of
self assessment in the UK in the 1990s could not have been picked up by any model.
A shift in the pattern of consumption away from taxed to untaxed goods may not be
picked up in our equations for indirect tax receipts unless we have very detailed
models. Both of these events will look like random (but explicable) elements in our
analysis of taxes. We know such things will happen in the future and we should set
our budgetary rules to deal with them. If receipts change permanently in this way, tax
rates somewhere have to change in response to keep the government on target.
The Model
The analysis in this paper uses the National Institute Global Model, NiGEM. It is an
estimated world model, which uses a ‘New-Keynesian’ framework in that agents are
presumed to be forward-looking but nominal rigidities slow the process of adjustment
to external events
2. Economies are linked through the effects of trade and
competitiveness and are fully simultaneous. There are also links between countries in
their financial markets as we model the structure and composition of wealth,
emphasising the role and origin of foreign assets and liabilities. We have forward-
looking wages, forward looking consumption, forward-looking exchange rates and
long-term interest rates are the forward convolution of short-term interest rates
3.
Each country has a description of its domestic economy that can be broken up into
sectors: the government, the labour market, consumption behaviour, the supply side of
the economy and financial markets. We need to ensure that interest rates are set to
stabilise the economy. We use a policy of nominal aggregate targeting and inflation
rate targeting, or two pillar strategy advocated by the European Central Bank
*) ( *) * ( 2 1 t t t t t t t P P Y P Y P r D - D + - = g g     (1)
All variables are in logs, PY is (the log of) nominal GDP, P is (the log of) the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation rate, and a * denotes a target.
We have models of direct and indirect taxes, and of government spending. We
consider the financing of the government deficit (BUD), and we allow either money
(M) or bond finance (DEBT).
                                                          
2 The theoretical structure and the relevant simulation properties of NiGEM are described in, NIESR
(2002) and Barrell, Dury, Hurst and Pain (2001)
3 We use the Extended Path Method to obtain model consistent expectations.6
BUD = DM + DDEBT (2)
Current fiscal revenues can be disaggregated. Personal taxes (TAX, which includes
both personal income tax and social security contributions) depend on personal
incomes. Corporate taxes (CTAX) depend on longer term profitability. Miscellaneous
taxes (mainly indirect; MTAX) depend on consumer expenditure. Transfers to
individuals (TRAN) depend upon prices and on unemployment, and hence these vary
with the economic cycle. Government consumption and investment (GC and GI)
which are assumed to be on plan except for random fluctuations, and they are not
influenced by the cycle. As GC and GI are in constant prices, we convert them to
nominal terms using the private consumption deflator CED and the GDP deflator P,
respectively. Government interest payments (GIP) are modelled as the income on a
perpetual inventory, the change in the debt stock each period paying the long interest
rate in the issue period until it is replaced
4. The budget balance thus reads:
BUD = TAX + MTAX + CTAX  - TRAN - GIP - GC*CED - GI*P  (3)
We normally assume budget deficits are kept within bounds in the longer term, and
taxes rise to do this. We can describe the simple fiscal rule as
Taxt = Taxt-1 + f [GBRT – GBR]  (4)
Where Tax is the direct tax rate, GBR is the government surplus target and actual
surplus. The feedback parameter f is designed to remove an excess deficit in less than
five years. If fiscal solvency is ‘off’, it is turned back on again after our experiment.
Shocks in NiGEM
Economies are subject to many shocks, and they are the source of uncertainty in the
economy. We define a shock as the part of the level or change in an economic
variable, such as consumption, that we cannot explain using other economic variables.
Take the equation for employment, for instance, where the number of people
employed (EE) depends on the level of output (Y), the rate of technical progress (TP)
and the real wage (W/P). Suppressing dynamics for simplicity we may write this as
Log(EE) = a + b*Log(Y) + c* Log (W/P) +d*TP + residual  (5)
The residual, or shock, is the part of the evolution of employment that cannot be
explained by economic factors. As such it is exogenous to the economic process we
are considering. We describe it here as the residual on an estimated structural equation
for investment, consumption, equity prices or employment, for instance and we
                                                          
4  The perpetual inventory attempts to take account of countries like Italy and Belgium where there are
large proportions of short-term public debt.7
discuss the nature of these residuals below. Where we assume rational expectations
and the next period’s outcome is taken as the expected value in the current period
5.
We can decompose shocks into demand shocks, supply shocks and fiscal shocks as in
Barrell and Hurst (2003). Demand shocks are those that affect the level of spending in
the economy, and we include consumption, investment, equity prices and exports.
Supply shocks are those affecting the labour market, such as employment, self
employment, hours and real wage (compensation equation) shocks. Tax shocks are
those that directly affect the budget deficit independently of economic events
elsewhere and we include transfers to individuals as well as direct, indirect and
corporate taxes.
Barrell and Hurst (2003) take the weighted average of these shocks by country to see
who has the largest shocks and which countries faced more supply shocks, demand
and fiscal shocks. The table below gives these indicators for the five largest European
economies using France as a base. They weight together demand shocks using shares
in GDP multiplied by the standard deviation of the individual shock over the period
1991q1 to 1999q4. Hence if exports are twice as important in GDP as investment but
the shocks have half the standard deviation then export shocks take the same weight
as investment shocks. They weight tax shocks by the importance of the item facing
shocked in the overall budget adjusted for the standard deviation of the shocks faced
by each item. Supply shocks are the standard deviation weighted average of shocks to
employment (labour demand) and the wage equation (labour supply).








Germany 1.26 1.38 2.17
Italy 1.28 1.2 2.37
Spain 1.26 1.13 1.91
UK 0.93 2.45 1.39
Source, Barrell and Hurst (2003) and NiGEM model residuals
Evaluating Automatic Stabilisers
If fiscal pacts operate and prevent discretionary policy then governments are left with
fiscal stabilisers to help them in mild upturns and downturns. Buti, Brunila and in’t
Veld (2002) use the Commission model QUEST to quantify automatic stabilisers, and
we can evaluate the properties of our model to do the same. In general automatic
                                                          
5 This is the ‘industry standard’ and is discussed at length in Barrell, Dury and Hurst (2003).
Expectations in these equations could come from a variety of sources. We could use a learning rule, or
we could assume that risk premia vary from tome period to time period to remove the unexplained
component in our equation. We do not regard either as satisfactory, and we use the residuals from our
estimated equations under the assumption of rational expectations.8
stabilisers increase with the size of the government sector and the share of cyclically
sensitive components of taxation and spending, and hence we would expect them to
vary across countries. Country specific factors such as the degree of openness and the
flexibility of the labour market will affect the size of stabilisers, and in general more
open economies will have lower multipliers and hence stabilisers.
Blanchard (2000) and Barrell and Hurst (2003) suggest that offsetting fiscal automatic
stabilisers in the face of supply shocks could stabilise the volatility of output, and
hence we only analyse the effectiveness of stabilisers in response to shocks to
demand. In order to do this we evaluate the impact of demand changes on the
economy and on tax revenues, and then look at the effects of tax changes on output.
We may write this as (where tax is direct taxes, itax is indirect taxes, ctax is
corporation, tran is transfers, C is consumption, I is investment, X is exports and Y is
GDP):
dS dX dX dy dS dI dI dy dS dC dC dy
dS dtran dtran dy
S dctax dctax dy dS ditax ditax dy dS dtax dtax dy DS Dy
/ * / / * / / * /
/ * /





The left hand side of this expression is the shock multiplier, which we evaluate for
consumption, investment and exports, The last three terms represent the shock
multipliers if there were no automatic stabilisers. If we have a consumption shock
then dI/dS and dX/dS are set to zero by definition, and similarly for investment and
export shocks. In order to evaluate the degree of automatic stabilisation we need to
evaluate the first four terms of the right hand side of this expression. This requires that
we calculate the impact of each shock on tax revenues and on transfer spending, and
that we calibrate the effect of an unanticipated change in tax revenues on output.
Evaluating shock multipliers
We first look a the impact of 1% of GDP changes in consumption, investment and
export volumes sustained for 1 year, when they return to baseline for one quarter and
subsequently the dynamics of the model are allowed to work. We assume that there is
no interest rate response in this year, but after the year the monetary authorities
respond. The fiscal authorities are assumed to leave tax rates unchanged for the year
and then adjust direct taxes to achieve their budget target. The model is run with
forward looking financial markets, and exchange rates and long rates jump in the first
period.
6 These multipliers are generally below those for discretionary changes in
government spending on goods and services, but these multipliers are also likely to be
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unstructured VAR analyses such as that of Blanchard and Perotti (2002).9
below 1.0. Barrell et al (2003) discuss standard fiscal simulations on NiGEM and
suggest reasons why Germany has the largest multipliers on this table.
Table 1: Multiplier Effects of a 1% of GDP impulse for one year
Consumption Investment Exports Average
France 0.697 0.615 0.667 0.682
Germany 0.885 0.765 0.89 0.886
Italy 0.599 0.529 0.582 0.586
UK 0.635 0.6 0.642 0.639
Spain 0.796 0.732 0.852 0.825
Euro Area 0.723 0.647 0.725 0.724
UK in EMU.  Interest rates fixed for the first year, No fiscal feedbacks for the first year’ The ECB uses
a two pillar strategy,  The exchange rate and the long rate are forward looking
Budget impacts of shocks
The impact of the shocks on the public finances will depend upon the importance of
the three types of tax we model (direct, indirect and corporate) as well as the
significance of transfers in the economy. We would expect shocks to consumption to
have a much more significant impact on the budget as consumers expenditure is a
significant part of the indirect tax base. However, the significance of indirect taxes
varies between countries, and hence the impacts of the consumption shock also varies.
Investment and export shocks are likely to be less tax rich.
The impact of the shock on the economy also affects the Government budget. If the
output effect of the shock is small then the impact on income and corporate tax
revenues will be smaller, as will the impact on transfer payments. In addition the
generosity of transfer payments differs significantly between countries, and is
probably least important in Italy for instance. Hence small open economies with low
multipliers will have lesser effects on the budget, and large countries with generous
social security systems will have large effects. We can see that the impacts of
consumption shocks on the budget is markedly higher than investment or export
shocks, and in general export shocks have slightly more budgetary impacts than do
investment shocks
Table 2: Effects on Budget as a % of GDP of a 1% of
GDP impulse for one year
 Consumption Investment Exports Average
France 0.46 0.14 0.15 0.31
Germany 0.58 0.27 0.31 0.45
Italy 0.47 0.18 0.20 0.28
UK 0.36 0.18 0.20 0.27
Spain 0.59 0.24 0.28 0.42
Euro
Area
0.51 0.19 0.22 0.34
UK in EMU.  Interest rates fixed for the first year, No fiscal feedbacks for the first year’ The ECB uses
a two pillar strategy,  The exchange rate and the long rate are forward looking10
Table 3 records the rescaled impact of the shocks, so that we can seethe tax richness
of each shock when GDP changes by 1% as a result.
Table 3: Effects on Budget as a % of GDP when GDP
changes by 1% as a result of shocks
  Consumption Investment Exports Average
France 0.67 0.23 0.22 0.45
Germany 0.66 0.35 0.35 0.51
Italy 0.79 0.35 0.34 0.48
UK 0.57 0.30 0.30 0.42
Spain 0.74 0.33 0.32 0.52
Euro
Area
0.73 0.29 0.29 0.46
UK in EMU.  Interest rates fixed for the first year, No fiscal feedbacks for the first year’ The ECB uses
a two pillar strategy,  The exchange rate and the long rate are forward looking
Scaling the impact of tax multipliers
Tax multipliers are generally small, as we see from Table 4. We have assumed that
the change in tax revenue is unanticipated because we wish to assess the ex-post
impact of lower tax receipts rather than the multiplier impact of an announcement of
temporarily lower tax rates
7. A cut in the corporate or indirect tax rate now, with the
announcement that the cut will be reversed in a year will lower the real interest rate
facing consumers and firms that do not face liquidity constraints. This reduction will
bring investment and consumption forward into this year and hence increase the
impact of the change on GDP. A fiscal change of this nature is effective in stabilising
the economy. However, these assumptions are not appropriate for analysing automatic
stabilisers.
Table 4 Tax Multipliers: The GDP impact of a
1% of GDP increase in taxes
Corporate Indirect Income
France -0.02 -0.35 -0.17
Germany -0.03 -0.20 -0.23
Italy -0.01 -0.10 -0.20
 UK -0.02 -0.27 -0.20
Spain -0.04 -0.13 -0.23
UK in EMU.  Interest rates fixed for the first year, No fiscal feedbacks for the first year’ The ECB uses
a two pillar strategy, The exchange rate and the long rate are forward looking. Tax changes are
unanticipated, and do not bring consumption or investment forward.
We should note that the impacts of a change in corporate taxation are limited in the
first year, although they do feed into the user cost of capital. A change in user cost
feeds only slowly into the investment decision, and hence the impact on output is not
great. Cyclically induced changes in corporate tax payments will take some time to
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influence firms, even when they are liquidity constrained. Direct taxes immediately
reduce incomes, and hence output declines through the impact on consumption. The
impact depends on the importance of direct taxes as a percent of personal incomes,
and on the speed of response of consumption to changes in income, and hence we
have impact multipliers that vary between 0.17 and 0.23.
Automatic Stabilisers
Automatic stabilisers in response to a shock are the proportion of the change in GDP
that is removed by the existence of the tax system. Using equation 6 above the
stabilising effect of taxes for a given shock can be described as
dS dtran dtran dy
S dctax dctax dy dS ditax ditax dy dS dtax dtax dy AS
/ * /




The proportion of the shock (PS) removed can be described as
) / /( AS dS dy AS PS + = (8)
Tables 1, 3 and 4 above contain the parameters we need for equations 7 and 8. The
smoothing properties of the stabilisers for each shock are reported in Table 5 below.
Table 5  The Smoothing Properties of Stabilisers
Smoothing by shock – the proportionate reduction of
The impact of a shock on GDP
Consumption Investment Exports
France -0.183 -0.029 -0.028
Germany -0.131 -0.070 -0.070
Italy -0.092 -0.047 -0.047
UK -0.110 -0.040 -0.040
Spain -0.115 -0.060 -0.059
Euro Area
-0.165 -0.078 -0.077
UK in EMU.  Interest rates fixed for the first year, No fiscal feedbacks for the first year’ The ECB uses
a two pillar strategy, The exchange rate and the long rate are forward looking. Tax changes are
unanticipated, and do not bring consumption or investment forward.
As we would expect, automatic stabilisers are most effective in response to
consumption shocks where they take out between 10 and 20 percent of the shocks.
Our estimates are below those of the Commission, in part because of the treatment of
corporate and indirect taxes in their study, and also because we assume that cyclical
variations in non-transfer spending are discretionary and not automatic. Their
estimates are highest at 38% for France and lowest at 14% for Ireland.
Assessing the overall smoothing power of automatic stabilisers requires that we take a
view on the importance of shocks and their probability. We apply GDP shares12
weighted by the relative volatility of the residuals reported in the Appendix to produce
a weighted average smoothing capacity, and we include it in the final column of Table
6 below. The individual columns are the contribution to this total from each of the
shocks. Both consumption and exports are more important in GDP than is investment,
and the ability to smooth shocks here matters. It appears that automatic stabilisers
have smoothed between 5 and 11 percent of the shocks that arrived between 1991 and
1999, and they have been most effective in Germany and France.
Table 6: Contribution to Overall Average using
GDP weighted standard deviations of shocks
Consumption Investment Exports Overall 
Stabilisin
g Effect
France -0.094 0.000 -0.014 -0.108
Germany -0.068 -0.001 -0.033 -0.102
Italy -0.028 0.000 -0.032 -0.061
UK -0.050 0.000 -0.022 -0.072
Spain -0.054 0.000 -0.031 -0.085
Euro Area -0.059 -0.001 -0.028 -0.088
UK in EMU.  Interest rates fixed for the first year, No fiscal feedbacks for the first year’ The ECB uses
a two pillar strategy, The exchange rate and the long rate are forward looking. Tax changes are
unanticipated, and do not bring consumption or investment forward.
Conclusion
We have used our model, NiGEM to evaluate automatic stabilisers in Europe. We
conclude that stabilisers are relatively weak, removing 6 to 11 per cent of the potential
variation in output. We do not assume that the change in tax revenues is anticipated
and affects forward looking behaviour, and we do not assume that non-transfers
expenditures vary automatically with the cycle. Other studies, such as Brunila, Buti
and in’t Veld (2002) do make these assumptions, and they noticeably increase the size
and variability of their estimates of the stabilising role of automatic responses.
We show that the impact of the cycle on the budget induced by shocks to demand is
between 0.4 and 0.5, lower than the commonly quoted 0.5
8. Cyclical variations in
Europe are relatively damped, and output gaps as large as 5 per cent of GDP are
hardly ever observed, as Massman, Mitchell and Weale (2003) show. This allows us
to conclude that we would be almost certain to avoid deficits of more than 3 per cent
of GDP if we allow budget deficit targets in excess of one per cent of GDP in Europe.
Our results are consistent with those in Barrell and Hurst (2003).
Scope for discretionary policy must remain in the face of large demand shocks, and
there is a case for building automatic tax rate responses to increases in the output gap,
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as suggested in H.M. Treasury (2003). There are a number of automatic responses that
could be triggered by stabilising fiscal rules. Announced and temporary changes in
indirect taxes change the real rate of interest facing consumers, and this will induce
those who are not liquidity constrained to pull their consumption forward. However, it
is difficult to be sure about the size of the output gap, and any estimate must attach an
indicator of its reliability. Both discretionary policy and automatic responses can be
counter productive in the face of supply shocks.
Appendix Standard deviations of structural shocks in Europe, 1991q1 to 1999q4
France Germany Italy Spain UK
Consumption 0.00926 0.01349 0.00672 0.01059 0.00766
Compensation 0.00392 0.00914 0.01108 0.00693 0.00603
Corporate Tax 0.10852 0.05335 0.02064 0.03462 0.14810
Employment 0.00032 0.00134 0.00344 0.00151 0.00112
Employees 0.00255 0.00472 0.00379 0.00612 0.00292
Equity Prices 0.05183 0.05949 0.07272 0.06522 0.04526
Hours 0.00169 0.00563 0.00132 0.00146 0.00362
Investment 0.00017 0.00112 0.00071 0.00049 0.00045
Indirect taxes 0.01509 0.02198 0.02160 0.02230 0.03788
Direct Taxes 0.00642 0.00965 0.00700 0.00758 0.01651
Transfers 0.00462 0.01516 0.01709 0.01194 0.00910
Exports of goods 0.01542 0.01983 0.02985 0.03179 0.01944
Exports of Services 0.03796 0.04740 0.05206 0.02977 0.0264814
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